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Anything for You Big Boy: A Comparative
Analysis of Banking Regulation in the United
States and the United Kingdom in Light of the
LIBOR Scandal
By Christopher Hall*
Abstract: In June 2012, Barclays Bank PLC entered into a settlement agreement with
the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority and the United States’
Commodities Futures Trading Commission that settled Barclays’s role in
manipulating the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR. The Barclays episode,
and related scandal, provides an opportunity to examine approaches to financial
regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States. This Note uses that
opportunity to compare and contrast the approach to financial regulation in the
United Kingdom and the United States. In particular, this Note contends that the
LIBOR scandal reveals three problems with the then-existing approaches to financial
regulation in the United Kingdom and United States. The three issues presented are
1) a problem with the people involved in setting LIBOR; 2) a problem with the
publicity that banks face when they submit their rates to LIBOR; and 3) a problem
with the way LIBOR is calculated that allows it to diverge too far from market
realities. This Note also argues that the “light-touch” approach that characterizes
financial regulation in the United Kingdom should be combined with the more
intensive approach to regulation found in the United States. The Wheatley Review of
LIBOR is held up as an example of this hybrid approach. This Note proceeds by first
briefly presenting the history of LIBOR as well as presenting an account of the
manipulation. The Note then reviews the structure of financial regulation in the
United Kingdom, with special attention paid to the recent Wheatley Review of LIBOR.
This Note presents a similar account of financial regulation in the United States,
before comparing and contrasting the two approaches. This comparison generates
the primary thrust of this Note’s argument that the two approaches should be
combined. Before concluding, this Note deals with several counter-arguments. The
conclusion then explains how the Wheatley Review embodies the hybrid approach
advocated in this Note.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In late June 2012, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority
(FSA) and Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays) announced a settlement
agreement in which Barclays agreed to pay a fine of £59.5 million ($92.8
million U.S. dollars) and acknowledged its role in manipulating the London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).1 Shortly thereafter, the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) each announced similar settlements.2 All told, Barclays paid
nearly half a billion dollars to settle with British and American authorities
for its role in manipulating LIBOR.3 In late 2012 and early 2013, similar
1

See Letter from U.K. Fin. Servs. Auth., Final Notice to Barclays Bank PLC (June 27, 2012)
[hereinafter Final Notice to Barclays], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/barclaysjun12.pdf.
2
See In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25 (June
27, 2012); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to
Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to
Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html.
3
Alexandra Alper & Kristin Ridley, Barclays Paying $453 Million to Settle LIBOR Probe,
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settlements were announced with both the Royal Bank of Scotland and
UBS.4
This Note focuses on the structure and philosophy guiding banking
regulation in the United States and the United Kingdom in light of the
LIBOR scandal. The LIBOR scandal provides an interesting opportunity to
compare the approaches that the authorities in the United States and the
United Kingdom have taken in regulating an increasingly complex
financial system. This Note argues that the LIBOR scandal reveals at least
three problems that can be used to evaluate financial regulation: (1) a
problem with the motivations of the people involved in manipulating
LIBOR; (2) a publicity problem that makes banks fear honesty; and (3) a
reality problem that lets rate setting become too divorced from real-world
transactions.
This Note further argues that the “light-touch” approach to financial
regulation that has guided regulators in the United Kingdom for much of
the twenty-first century, which is characterized by a cooperative, principlebased approach to regulation,5 ought to be reasonably combined with the
more intensive regulatory scheme of the United States to arrive at a hybrid
solution. In responding to a few objections to regulation in the light of the
recent financial crisis, as well as some empirical data on the impact of
financial regulation and economic performance, I argue that this hybrid
approach can prevent future rate-rigging without stifling growth. I also
contend that the recommendations of the Wheatley Review6 embody this
hybrid approach by addressing some of the causes of the LIBOR scandal
without completely abandoning the light-touch approach to economic
regulation.
This Note proceeds in seven parts. Part II follows this introduction
and presents a brief history of LIBOR and a discussion of its significance in
the global marketplace. Part III explains the facts of the LIBOR raterigging scandal. Part IV reviews the British approach to financial
regulation both before and after the LIBOR scandal. This part also
discusses how the traditional approach to banking regulation in the United
Kingdom is changing in the face of the scandal. Part V presents the U.S.
REUTERS (June 27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-barclays-libor-idUSBRE85
Q0J720120627. It is not clear whether Barclays is done paying for its sins as individual states continue
to investigate. See U.S. Investigates LIBOR Scandal, IRISH TIMES (July 16, 2012), http://www.irishtimes.com/
newspaper/breaking/2012/0716/ breaking9.html.
4
See Fin. Servs. Auth., Final Notice to The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, FSA Reference No.
121882 (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/rbs.pdf; Fin. Servs. Auth., Final Notice
to UBS AG, FSA Reference No. 186958 (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/
ubs.pdf; In re The Royal Bank of Scot. PLC & RBS Japan Ltd., CFTC Docket 13-14 (Feb. 6, 2013); In
re UBS AG & UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd, CFTC Docket 13-09 (Dec. 19, 2012).
5
Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities
Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1032 (2009).
6
See infra Part IV.B.
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financial regulation framework and two of the agencies involved in the
LIBOR scandal: the CFTC and the DOJ.
Finally, Part VI uses the LIBOR scandal to highlight some of the
relevant differences and similarities of the U.K. and U.S. approaches to
banking regulation. Ultimately, this Note suggests that a combination of
the two approaches is best. It also considers an objection to this hybrid
approach and uses some empirical data to evaluate the argument and the
objection. Finally, this Note argues that a hybrid position is largely
embodied in the recommendations of the Wheatley Review because these
recommendations provide for stronger oversight while not stifling
economic growth. Part VII concludes by providing a summary of this
Note’s main argument.
II. THE HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF LIBOR
LIBOR was created in the mid-1980s, when banks developed
increasingly complex trading instruments that allowed them to participate
in a variety of transactions. Generally, these transactions involved trading
currency futures with each other.7 While these investment vehicles were
attractive, many of them relied on interest rate agreements that had to be
ratified before a contract could be signed.8 The British Bankers
Association (BBA) created LIBOR in 1984 as a response to this problem
and as a means to standardize the rate-setting process.9
At its inception, the BBA calculated LIBOR by averaging responses
from participating banks to the question: “At what rate do you think
interbank term deposits will be offered by one prime bank to another prime
bank for a reasonable market size today at 11am?”10 In 1988, the BBA
updated this question to ask: “At what rate could you borrow funds, were
you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a
reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?”11
Thompson Reuters, who calculates the rate on behalf of the BBA,
performs the LIBOR calculation daily after participating banks submit their
responses.12 The calculation ignores the highest and lowest quartiles of
submissions and averages the remaining submissions. The result is the

7
British Bankers Ass’n, Historical Perspective, BBALIBOR.COM, http://bbalibor.com/bbaliborexplained/historical-perspective (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
This change was driven by a consensus that the notion of a “prime bank” was no longer
meaningful. See id.
12
Christopher Allessi, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 19,
2012), http://www.cfr.org/uk/understanding-libor-scandal/p28729.
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LIBOR rate for that day.13 At the time of the scandal, the BBA offered the
LIBOR rate for ten different currencies with a variety of different
hypothetical loan durations, varying from overnight to twelve months.14
Thus, 150 different LIBOR rates are actually calculated each day.15
Although originally created as a tool for interbank lending, LIBOR
has been widely used as a financial benchmark. According to the CFTC,
use of LIBOR includes “U.S. based swaps transactions and futures
contracts, as well as home mortgages and commercial and personal
consumer loans.”16 The value of “Forward Rate Agreements” between
banks, based on LIBOR, had a value exceeding $500 trillion by the end of
2011.17 In other words, LIBOR has implications for wide ranging classes
of borrowers “from Russian oil producers to homeowners in
Detroit . . . . Fibbing by banks could mean that millions of borrowers
around the world are paying artificially low rates on their loans.”18 It is no
wonder that allegations of rate-fixing have gained such widespread
attention.
III. THE STORY OF THE LIBOR RATE FIXING SCANDAL
As mentioned in Part II, the BBA derives LIBOR from responses
submitted by individual banks to a hypothetical question. Since those
responses were not linked to transactional data, they were not based on
actual market conditions.19 This lack of connection to empirical trading
data left LIBOR open to manipulation by those responsible for determining
its value.
Although Barclays is not the only bank guilty of LIBOR manipulation,
it was the first bank to enter into a LIBOR-related settlement with the FSA
and CFTC.20 Accordingly, the relevant authorities have laid out the facts of
13

Id.
British Bankers Ass’n, The Basics, BBALIBOR.COM, http://bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/thebasics (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
15
Id.
16
In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 2 (June
27, 2012).
17
Id. A Forward Rate Agreement is a contract that sets the interest to be paid between parties for
an obligation that has a future start date.
See Forward Rate Agreement, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fra.asp#axzz2L5ZftgoX (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
18
Carrick Mollenkamp, Bankers Cast Doubt On Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16,
2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120831164167818299.html.
19
HM TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: INITIAL DISCUSSION PAPER 12 (2012)
[hereinafter THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: INITIAL DISCUSSION], available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191763/condoc_wheatley_review.pdf.
20
The Barclays settlement was announced in June 2012, the RBS and UBS settlements followed
several months later. For a timeline of events surrounding the scandal, including when the settlements
were announced, see Timeline: LIBOR-fixing Scandal, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2013) http://www.bbc.co.uk/
14
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Barclays’s case more clearly and made those facts available for analysis
longer than the facts surrounding manipulation at other banks. This Note
uses Barclays as a proxy to explain how and why various persons and
institutions manipulated the LIBOR rate.
On June 27, 2012, the FSA announced its settlement with Barclays.21
In its findings, the FSA charged Barclays with inappropriate LIBOR
submissions, alleging that Barclays’s LIBOR submissions were fraudulent
for two reasons. First, the FSA found that “Barclays acted inappropriately
on numerous occasions between January 2005 and July 2008 by making
US dollar submissions . . . that took into account requests made by its
[own] interest rate derivatives traders.”22 Barclays’s LIBOR submissions
also considered requests from derivatives traders from other banks.23
Second, the FSA found that Barclays had manipulated LIBOR submissions
by “taking into account concerns over the negative media perception of
Barclays’s LIBOR submissions.”24 LIBOR submissions are supposed to be
formed only as a response to the prompt question. Consideration of either
of these factors was therefore inappropriate because neither factor was
directly related to the cost of borrowing money.25 The CFTC’s charges and
findings in the United States echoed those of the FSA.26
A. Manipulations of LIBOR at the Request of Traders
Barclays made its LIBOR submissions through its London Money
Market Desk, where a small number of individuals were charged with
submitting the bank’s daily LIBOR responses.27 At the time, the Money
Market Desk was charged with “manag[ing] Barclays’s liquidity position
and . . . ensur[ing] that Barclays [was] fully funded each day in all
currencies . . . .”28 Both the FSA and CFTC found that Barclays did not
have sufficient internal controls or monitoring in place to determine how
these submitters should operate.29

news/business-18671255.
21
See Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1.
22
Id. at 2. For an analysis of the FSA finding, see infra Part III.A.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 3.
25
Id.
26
In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 2–3 (June
27, 2012).
27
See id. at 7. According to the CFTC, one Senior LIBOR submitter was primarily assisted by
another, more junior money market trader. Id. at 7. It is not clear exactly how many Barclays
employees were involved in the process of submitting LIBOR rates.
28
See id.
29
See id. Noting that Barclays did not have any controls or procedures in place that detailed how
LIBOR submissions should be determined or monitored. See also Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
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On many occasions, from at least the middle of 2005, traders with
connections to the Barclays Money Market Desk would send requests that
Barclays change their LIBOR submission that day.30 Traders would
generally ask for either a direction for manipulation or a specific number
the requestor hoped to see Barclays submit.31 Because of the way LIBOR
was calculated, Barclays’s submission of a particular rate number had the
potential to influence the official LIBOR rate for that day. For example, a
trader who held a position that would benefit from a lower LIBOR might
ask the Barclays Money Market Desk to lower its submission that day so
that the trader’s position benefited. Some of the specific messages
highlighted by the CFTC concerning the one month (1m) and three month
(3m) LIBOR show how transparent these requests were:
“Your annoying colleague again . . . Would love to get a high 1m
Also if poss a low 3m . . . if poss . . . thanks” (February 3, 2006,
Trader in London to Submitter).
“Hi Guys, We got a big position in 3m libor for the next 3 days.
Can we please keep the libor fixing at 5.39 for the next few days.
It would really help. We do not want to fix any higher than that.
Tks a lot.” (September 13, 2006, Senior Trader in New York to
Submitter).32
The record leaves no doubt that the submitters at the Money Market
Desk responded to these requests.
Sometimes, Barclays’s LIBOR
submitters would respond generally that they would “do [their] best.”33
Other times, the submitters would specifically confirm that they had made
a change in response to a request or would tell the trader exactly where
they planned to set their LIBOR submission:

1, at 3.
30
See Christopher Allessi, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 19,
2012), http://www.cfr.org/united-kingdom/understanding-libor-scandal/ p28729.
31
See In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 9
(June 27, 2012).
32
Id. at 9–10. These communications occurred almost entirely over email or instant messaging
programs, so the original message formatting is retained above in order to illustrate the lack of
formalities in these messages. They suggest an extremely close and informal relationship between
traders benefitting from specific LIBOR rates and the Barclays employees in charge of setting those
rates. The FSA specifically noted “[t]he routine nature of requests demonstrates that the Derivatives
Traders considered Barclays took their requests into account when determining its submissions.” Final
Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 12.
33
In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 10 (June
27, 2012).

159

HALL_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3/12/14 9:25 PM

34:153 (2013)

“Am going 13, think the market will go 12-12 ½.” (November
14, 2005, Submitter’s response to a swaps trader request for a
very high one-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR submission, preferably
a submission of “13+”).
“Done . . . for you big boy . . .” (April 7, 2006, Submitter’s
response to swaps trader requests for low one-month and threemonth U.S. Dollar LIBOR).34
In response to this acquiescence by Barclays’s LIBOR submitters,
traders often expressed profound gratitude.35 The overall picture is one of a
close working relationship between Barclays’s LIBOR submitters and the
traders who stood to benefit one way or another by changes in LIBOR.
Both the CFTC and the FSA found that this relationship led Barclays to
submit LIBOR rates that impermissibly considered external factors and
were not simply in response to the prompt question that the BBA used in
defining LIBOR.36
B. Manipulation of LIBOR at the Request of Barclays’s
Management
Barclays derivative traders were not the only employees applying
pressure on the bank’s LIBOR submitters. Both the CFTC and FSA found
that Barclays’s management pressured its LIBOR rate submitters to set
rates based on public image as it related to the perceived link between its
LIBOR rate-submissions and the bank’s financial health.
During the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2008, there was considerable
worry about the health of individual banks and their ability to withstand the
crisis.37 This fear affected Barclays’s LIBOR submissions in several ways.
Barclays did not “want to report the high rates they [were] paying for shortterm loans because they [did not] want to tip off the market that they [were]
desperate for cash.”38 Barclays’s managers apparently believed that an
appearance of desperation could result from the way LIBOR is calculated.39
A bank might appear desperate because the LIBOR rate it submits is
supposed to represent the cost of currency to that bank, but because banks
34

Id.
For instance, one trader exclaimed, “Dude. I owe you big time! Come over one day after work
and I’m opening a bottle of Bollinger.” Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 19.
36
Id. at 22; In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25,
11 (June 27, 2012).
37
Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 23.
38
Mollenkamp, supra note 18.
39
Id.
35
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tend to charge struggling institutions a higher rate, a higher rate submission
could be seen as a sign that the bank was struggling financially. If the
market believed that Barclays was paying more to borrow than other banks,
the market might view that as a sign that Barclays was struggling to
survive. That perceived weakness would hurt Barclays’s ability to raise
capital or otherwise be competitive in the marketplace. Additionally,
because of the financial crisis, lending between banks had come to a virtual
standstill, leaving very few transactions to compare a bank’s quoted
LIBOR rate and the rate they were actually paying to borrow money.40 In
other words, due to the lack of real-world transactions, there was no way to
verify the truthfulness of a bank’s statement on what borrowing money
might cost them.
Banks’ fears that their LIBOR submissions could be viewed as a sign
of weakness had some basis in reality. A September 2007 blog post on the
influential business website Bloomberg.com pointed to a Barclays LIBOR
submission—which was the highest on the U.S. dollar LIBOR panel—as a
sign that Barclays might be having liquidity problems.41 It then asked, “So
what the hell is happening at Barclays and its Barclays Capital securities
unit that is prompting its peers to charge it premium interest rates in the
money market?”42 This kind of media scrutiny makes banks’ fears more
understandable. Additionally, Barclays believed that banks were unfairly
submitting numbers that were too low for market conditions and expressed
their concerns to both the FSA and BBA.43
Nevertheless, in an effort to avoid negative media attention,
Barclays’s management gave specific instructions to the effect that
Barclays “should not ‘stick its head above the parapet’ in terms of its
LIBOR submissions.”44 In other words, Barclays did not want to risk being
seen as financially weak by submitting LIBOR rates that might attract
unwanted attention. The FSA and CFTC each found that Barclays’s
consideration of media reports and its public image were also
impermissible under the definition of LIBOR.45
The Barclays episode reveals three distinct problems. First, because
of the close relationship between LIBOR submitters and those who benefit
from their submissions, there is a distinct “people problem” where personal
relationships and personal gains incentivize manipulation. Second, there is
40
THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 19, at 10–15 (discussing generally the
effects and problems of the lack of actual transactions and the “signaling effect” of LIBOR
submissions); Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 23.
41
Mark Gilbert, Barclays Takes a Money-Market Beating, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2007, 4:21 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8uEKKBYY7As.
42
Id.
43
Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 25–27.
44
Id. at 25.
45
Id. at 29–31.
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a corresponding “publicity problem” since the submitting institution has an
incentive to manipulate its submissions to influence public perception of
the institution’s health. Finally, there is an identifiable “reality problem”
that stems from the hypothetical nature of the LIBOR submission process.
Because LIBOR has not been tied to real-world transactions, it lacked a
means to verify the numbers that banks submit. These three problems are
revisited below as a means of analyzing the different approaches to banking
regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States.
IV. BANKING REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
This part discusses the structure and philosophy of financial regulation
in the United Kingdom. Subpart A presents the Financial Services
Authority and its guiding policies articulated prior to the LIBOR scandal.
After the LIBOR scandal became known, authorities in the U.K. created
the Wheatley Review (Review) to examine LIBOR and suggest
improvements.46 The Review represents a break from the guiding
philosophy of the pre-LIBOR scandal era. Subpart B presents the Review
and the corresponding changes in financial regulation in the United
Kingdom.
A. The Financial Services Authority
The main financial regulator in the United Kingdom is the Financial
Services Authority, “a one-stop regulatory shop for virtually all aspects of
financial services in the United Kingdom.”47 Parliament created the FSA
when it passed the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 (FSMA).48
Parliament enacted the FSMA in order to “provide for a single, statutory,
financial service regulator . . . .”49 The FSA is thus the result of an
intentional effort to simplify the United Kingdom’s regulatory structure.
Banking supervision responsibilities were transferred from the Bank
of England to the newly created FSA in the Bank of England Act 1998.50
The Bank of England gained statutory authority to regulate banks in the
46
See The Chancellor Has Commissioned Martin Wheatley to Undertake a Review of the
Framework for the Setting of LIBOR, HM TREASURY (July 30, 2012), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
wheatley_review.htm. The Wheatley Review was named after Martin Wheatley, a former director of
the FSA and the current head of the newly created Financial Conduct Authority.
47
Margaret Cole, The Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities &
Financial Law: “The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better?” 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 267
(2007) (Margaret Cole was the Director of Enforcement at the FSA from 2005 to 2012).
48
Legal Framework, FIN. SERV. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/who/accountability/
legal/ index.shtml (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
49
Id.
50
Bank of England Act, 1998, c. 11, §§ 21–30 (U.K.).
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United Kingdom in 1979.51 Until then, the regulatory relationship between
the government and banks had only been informal.52 Hesitancy to invoke
statutory authority in regulating banks exemplifies the general approach of
self-regulation that the United Kingdom has taken toward financial
institutions.
The FSA is operationally independent from the government of the
United Kingdom.53 A Treasury-appointed board governs the FSA and this
board is headed by an executive chairman.54 Perhaps most striking is the
fact that the FSA is not funded by the government of the United Kingdom.
Instead, it is “funded entirely by the firms [it] regulate[s].”55 Although it is
operationally independent, the FSA reports to Parliament annually.56
The FSMA provides four guiding principles to direct the FSA’s
operation.57 The FSMA charges the FSA with: (1) maintaining confidence
in the U.K. financial system;58 (2) contributing to the protection and
enhancement of the stability of the U.K. financial system;59 (3) securing the
appropriate degree of protection for consumers;60 and (4) reducing the
extent to which it is possible for a business carried on . . . to be used for a
purpose connected with financial crime.61
In order to guide the firms it regulates, the FSA published a handbook
which includes principles that “are a general statement of the fundamental
obligations of firms under the regulatory system.”62 These general
principles are the standard by which the FSA measures financial firms in
the United Kingdom. Violation of the principles exposes a firm to

51
See Marianne Ojo, The Financial Services Authority: A Model of Improved Accountability?,
MPRA PAPER, No. 580 (Nov. 7, 2005), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/ 580/1/MPRA_paper_580.pdf.
52
See id.
53
Who Are We?, FIN. SERV. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
54
The Board, FIN. SERV. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who/board (last visited Nov. 18,
2012); Management Structure, FIN. SERV. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/ who/management (last
visited Nov. 18, 2012).
55
Who Are We?, supra note 53. Although striking, the potential conflict of interest is outside the
scope of this paper. The funding structure of the FSA can be compared with the structure of the BBA,
LIBOR’s parent organization. The BBA is “the leading trade association for the [U.K.] banking and
financial services sector.” See About Us, BRITISH BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.bba.org.uk/about-us
(last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
56
Cole, supra note 47, at 268.
57
Id.
58
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 3 (U.K.).
59
Financial Services Act, 2010, c. 28, § 1 (U.K.) (amending the Financial Services and Markets
Act of 2000 to include financial stability as an objective). See also Statutory Objectives, FIN. SERV.
AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/aims/statutory (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
60
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 5 (U.K.).
61
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 6 (U.K.).
62
FIN. SERV. AUTH., FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY HANDBOOK princ. 1.1.2 (2013),
http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/PRIN/1/1.
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disciplinary sanctions.63 It was these “Principles of Businesses” that
Barclays violated in the LIBOR scandal, specifically Principles Two,
Three, and Five.64 The FSA has been an advocate for this principles-based
approach towards regulation where “the focus is on the outcomes rather
than on the prescription of detailed rules.”65
As a matter of policy, the guiding principle behind the FSA’s
enforcement branch prior to the LIBOR scandal has been a light-touch
approach to regulation. Regulators using the light-touch approach
“do not engage in aggressive regulation, preferring [instead] to intervene
only when necessary,[] and only in limited ways.”66 Light-touch aims at a
cooperative relationship with regulated entities, in part, to overcome the
inevitable information disadvantage that regulators face as they try to
monitor and control their constituents.67
Margaret Cole, the Director of the Enforcement Division of the FSA
from 2005 to 2012, characterized the light-touch approach as one where
“the FSA is not an enforcement-led regulator at all, but one that uses
supervision and ongoing relationships with the firms [it regulates] as its
front-line means of regulation.”68 Cole described the relationship between
the FSA and the firms it regulates as one where the FSA “create[s]
incentives for firms to focus on compliance in return for a regulatory
dividend, and that [dividend is] less regulatory intervention.”69 The lighttouch approach views regulatory intervention as something of a last resort,
which should only be used after all market-based solutions have failed.70
The main benefit of the light-touch approach is a greater attraction of
business capital to the United Kingdom.71 At least one financial

63

Id. princ. 1.1.7.
Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 1, at 2. Principle Two states, “A firm must conduct its
business with due skill, care[,] and diligence;” Principle Three states, “A firm must take reasonable care
to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems;”
and Principle Five states, “A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct.” FIN. SERV.
AUTH., FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY HANDBOOK, princ. 2.1.1 (2013), http://fshandbook.info/FS/
html/FCA/PRIN/2/1.
65
Cole, supra note 47, at 270.
66
Banking Regulation, ECONOMICS ONLINE, http://economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/
Banking+regulation.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
67
Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities
Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1032 (2009).
68
Cole, supra note 47, at 267.
69
Id. at 271.
70
Id. at 269.
71
See Banking Regulation, supra note 66; Myles Neligan, UK’s FSA to Propose Overhaul of
Global Bank Regulation, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/17/fsaidUSLH94367220090317 (“Legal experts warn any tightening of the FSA regime could trigger an
exodus of leading banks away from the City of London unless it forms part of a coordinated
international clampdown.”).
64
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commentator has called the FSA an asset that the London market has in
contrast to other major markets with more invasive regulators.72 Former
Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Ed Balls, provided the following
summary:
The Government’s interest in this area is specific and clear: to
safeguard the light touch and proportionate regulatory regime
that has made London a magnet for international business. . . .
[New] legislation will confer a new and specific power on the
FSA to veto rule changes proposed by exchanges that would be
disproportionate in their impact on the pivotal economic role that
exchanges play in the UK and EU economies.73
Prior to the LIBOR scandal, FSA officials proudly touted their lighttouch approach to economic regulation. One can easily imagine how this
focus on a light-touch approach set the stage for the LIBOR scandal.
Banks like Barclays and their individual employees, constrained only by
general principles, may have felt too much freedom or at least may have
believed that they could get away with their manipulative practices. By
itself, the light-touch approach makes for an interesting comparison to the
approach taken by the United States because it represents a clear contrast to
U.S. financial regulations. However, the United Kingdom’s reaction to the
LIBOR scandal, contained in the recommendations of the “Wheatley
Review,” alters any assessment of U.K. banking regulation because these
recommendations are more restrictive than the light-touch approach.
B. The Wheatley Review
As the LIBOR rate manipulation scandal became public, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer74 commissioned a review to investigate and
report on the necessity of reforms to LIBOR. The review would consider
the adequacy of sanctions in the face of LIBOR manipulation, and the
implications of LIBOR manipulation for other similar financial
benchmarks.75 The Review was named after Martin Wheatley, the man
appointed to head it.76 When he was appointed, Wheatley was the
72

Damian Reece, London Confirms Its Reputation as the Capital City, Business Comment, THE
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 27, 2006), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/2947958/Business-comment.html.
73
Ed Balls MP, Econ. Sec’y to the Treasury, Financial Services: A U.K. Perspective, Speech at the
Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce and the British Chamber of Commerce (Sept. 13, 2006), available
at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2277.htm.
74
The Chancellor of Exchequer is the head of the treasury in the U.K. See HM Treasury, GOV.UK,
http://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-treasury/about (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
75
THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 19, at 3.
76
Press Release, The Rt Hon. George Osbourne MP, HM Treasury, The Wheatley Review (July 30,
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managing director of the FSA, as well as the chief-executive designate of
the newly-created Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).77 The Review
published an initial discussion paper in August 2012,78 which was followed
by a period in which affected parties could submit responses. A final
report, which included the Review’s recommendations, was published in
September 2012.79 This subsection explains the recommendations of the
Review that have been adopted by the U.K.
Many findings of the Review mirror the findings of the FSA and
CFTC in their cases against Barclays. The Review found that “[b]anks and
individuals working for banks have an incentive to attempt to manipulate
the submissions . . . either to signal their perceived institutional
creditworthiness or to support trading positions.”80 The Review also found
that the decline in inter-bank lending had forced LIBOR submissions to
rely increasingly “on expert judgment rather than transaction data.”81 In
other words, the Review identified the people problem, publicity problem,
and reality problem described in Part III.
In its initial paper, the Review identified several key weaknesses in
the then-current U.K. regulatory model as it related to LIBOR. Those
weaknesses included the opportunity for manipulation, the lack of
independence and oversight, and the potential lack of sanctions to deter
individual actors.82 After a period for comment on its initial paper, the
Review presented its final report. The final report made a number of
specific recommendations to address the problems identified with LIBOR.
First, the report recommended that authorities “introduce statutory
regulation of administration of, and submission to, LIBOR.”83 The Review
argued that this change would allow the FSA to more directly regulate
LIBOR submissions by giving the FSA power it had previously lacked.84
The Review also advocated for the creation of new criminal offenses
under the FSMA.85 Previously, the FSMA did not empower the FSA to
2012), available at http://hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review.htm.
77
Id. The Financial Conduct Authority was created in June 2012 as one of two new agencies to
replace the FSA. The FCA became active in April 2013. It is “responsible for regulation of conduct in
retail, as well as wholesale, financial markets, and the infrastructure that supports those markets.”
Regulatory Reform—Background, FIN. SERVS. AUTH., http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/reg_reform/
background (last updated Feb. 2, 2012).
78
THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 19.
79
THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT (2012), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191762/wheatley_review_li
bor_finalreport_280912.pdf [hereinafter THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: FINAL REPORT].
80
THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: INITIAL DISCUSSION, supra note 19, at 3.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 9.
83
THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: FINAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 11.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 18.
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pursue criminal charges against individuals for attempting to manipulate
LIBOR.86 Specifically, the Review suggested “[amending the] FSMA to
include, as an offence, the making of a false or misleading statement in
order to manipulate LIBOR.”87 While acknowledging the United
Kingdom’s general aversion to proliferating criminal sanctions, the Review
argued that civil penalties may not “be sufficient to prevent such behaviour
in all cases.”88
The Review also recommended that the administration of LIBOR be
removed from the BBA and moved into a new institution that would be
distinct from the submitting banks in a way the BBA, whose mission is to
be an advocate for the banks, could not be.89 However, the Review
remained committed to the idea “that market participants should continue
to play a significant role in the production and oversight of LIBOR.”90
Finally, the Review made several recommendations to alter the
mechanics of calculating LIBOR.91 In order to counter the concern that
LIBOR submissions are not adequately connected to market conditions, the
Review recommended that submitting banks “explicitly and transparently”
use actual transaction data to corroborate their rate submissions.92 The
Review also recommended a delay of three months before publishing any
individual bank’s LIBOR submission.93 This change was suggested to
counter the creditworthiness-signaling concern.94
The Review’s final report represents solutions to the three problems
identified in Part III, as well as a move away from the light-touch approach
to financial regulation. The reality problem is solved by tying LIBOR
submissions to actual transactions, so that the veracity of a bank’s
submission can be confirmed. The publicity problem is solved, or at least
its severity is diminished, by delaying the publication of submitted rates.
86

Id.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 21–22.
90
Id. at 7.
91
In July 2013, NYSE Euronext purchased LIBOR from the BBA. Although this sale eliminates the
BBA’s participation in LIBOR, it is unclear how the sale will change the regulation surrounding the rate as
it will still be under the jurisdiction of the U.K.’s financial regulators. See Phillipa Leighton-Jones, Sold for
£1 NYSE Euronext Takes Over Libor, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT BLOG (Jul. 9, 2013 8:05 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/09/libor-sold-to-nyse-euronext-how-did-we-get-here/?KEYWORDS
=libor+scandal; Max Colchester, Is Libor Now Beyond Manipulation?, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT BLOG,
(Jul. 9, 2013 12:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/09/is-libor-now-beyond-manipulation/
?mod=wsj_nview_latest.
92
THE WHEATLEY REVIEW: FINAL REPORT, supra note 79, at 27. The Review also made
suggestions concerning which actual transactions submitting banks should look to corroborate their
LIBOR submissions, particularly during periods of low market activity.
93
Id. at 38.
94
Id.
87
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While it is conceivable that the media or analysts will still speculate on a
bank’s financial health based on these delayed publications, the value of
three-month-old data is questionable.
The Review’s solution to the people problem—proposing new
criminal sanctions—is particularly important. The Review acknowledged
the traditional hesitancy of creating new sanctions, but came to the
conclusion that some new sanctions were needed to solve this problem.
This appears to be a move away from the principles-based approach of
light-touch, a conclusion confirmed by the FSA’s suggestion that their
regulatory power be increased and the administration of LIBOR be moved
from the BBA.
Yet, the Review’s suggestions are not a total break from the lighttouch approach. The Review tempered its call for new powers and criminal
sanctions by declining to call for government administration of LIBOR and
by reaffirming its commitment to the involvement of banks in the LIBOR
regulatory process. Even though it appears that the principles-based
approach that characterizes light-touch regulation has receded some in the
Review’s final report, the cooperative relationship with firms remains
prominent. For instance, although the Review suggests the development of
“clear principles” for global financial benchmarks such as LIBOR, the
Review also calls for the power to compel banks to participate in the
LIBOR rate-setting process.95 In other words, as the light-touch approach
would suggest, the Review remains committed to banks being involved in
the LIBOR process while at the same time calling for the power to compel
bank involvement if necessary, a regulatory power that appears to allow for
greater intervention than characterized in the light-touch approach. What
remains after the Review’s recommendations is a more nuanced approach
to financial regulation that balances regulatory power and bank
involvement in how the government regulates them.
C. Responses to the Wheatley Review
The U.K. government responded to the Wheatley Review with a fullthroated endorsement of its recommendations.96 The Treasury announced
it would amend the Financial Services Bill to bring LIBOR submissions
under statutory authority and expand criminal sanctions to cover attempts
to manipulate LIBOR.97 The Treasury also agreed with the Review’s
recommendation that the administration of LIBOR be moved from the
95

Id. at 8–9.
See Written Ministerial Statement, HM Treasury, Wheatley Review of LIBOR (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/wms_
fst_171012.pdf.
97
Id. at 2.
96
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BBA to a successor still to be determined.98
Public reception to the Review was mixed. Some sources suggested
that the changes meant nothing less than “the death of LIBOR.”99 Others
believed that the Review was “a welcome step” and that stripping the BBA
of its role in administering LIBOR was appropriate.100 The BBA indicated
that it would support moving LIBOR’s administration to a new body.101
The government’s embrace of the Review’s recommendations
strengthens the conclusion that the light-touch approach to financial
regulation in the United Kingdom has come to an end. When coupled with
similar regulatory changes made as a result of the sub-prime lending crisis,
this conclusion seems inescapable.102 Although firms will remain involved
in the administration of LIBOR,103 the expansion of procedures and
regulations LIBOR-submitting banks now face is unprecedented in the
United Kingdom. Indeed, LIBOR-submitting banks and their individual
employees may even face criminal sanctions if they manipulate LIBOR in
the future.104 Perhaps more telling of the future of financial regulation in
the United Kingdom is the total absence in the Treasury’s comments of a
commitment to involvement of affected firms in the regulatory process.105
V. BANK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
This part outlines some of the financial regulatory structure in the
United States. It is necessarily a sketch because of the complexity involved
in the overlapping state and federal regulatory schemes present in the
United States. According to one account, the financial sector in the United
States has as many as 115 regulatory agencies operating at various levels of
government.106 Given the proliferation of regulatory agencies, it is no
surprise that banks face a daunting array of regulators:

98

Id.
Andrew Marder, The Death of Libor, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.fool.com/
investing/general/2012/09/27/the-death-of-libor.aspx (“I think that if enough are found with blood on
their hands, we could be looking at the beginning of the end for the post 1980s bank.”).
100
Wheatley Review: City Reaction, WALL ST. J. THE SOURCE BLOG (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2012/09/28/wheatley-review-city-reaction/.
101
BBA Statement on Conclusions of Wheatley Review into LIBOR, BBA (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.bba.org.uk/media/article/bba-statement-on-conclusions-of-wheatley-review-into-libor.
102
Huw Jones, New UK Watchdog Warns Banks “Light Touch” Era is Over, REUTERS (Oct. 22,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/22/britain-banks-regulation-idUSL5E8LM8ZI20121022.
103
See Written Ministerial Statement, supra note 96, at 3.
104
See id. at 1 (endorsing the creation of new criminal sanctions for future rate manipulation).
105
Id. This absence is particularly noticeable compared to the Review’s comments on firm
involvement.
106
Yesha Yadav, Looking for the Silver Lining: Regulatory Reform After the “Credit Crunch,” 15
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 314, 323 (2010).
99
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A firm that is engaged in banking, securities, and insurance
business, or offering products that overlap within these categories
(e.g. certain types of annuities) may find itself being supervised
by the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodities
and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC), the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC), together with relevant banking, securities
and insurance regulators at the state level.107
In addition to this multitude of agencies, the history of banking
regulation is rather chaotic as well. Banking regulation in the United States
“represents a set of accumulated responses to a long history of financial
crises, scandals, happenstance, personalities[,] and compromises among a
broad and competing array of industry and governmental units.”108 This
Note focuses on two of the federal regulatory agencies relevant to the
LIBOR scandal: the CFTC and the DOJ.109
A. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission
As Part II described, the CFTC fined Barclays significantly for
violating sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA).110 One of the purposes of the CEA was to “ensure fair practice and
honest dealings on commodity exchanges, for the protection of the market
itself as well as those who could be injured by unreasonable fluctuations in
commodity prices.”111 As the CFTC summarized the relevant sections of
the CEA, “Together, Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a(2) of the Act prohibit acts
of attempted manipulation.”112

107

Id. at 324.
Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221
(Apr. 2000).
109
That is not to suggest that banks do not face liability on a state level; they likely do. See, e.g., US
Investigates LIBOR Scandal, IRISH TIMES (Jul. 16, 2012), http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/
2012/0716/breaking9.html (explaining the role of the New York and Connecticut attorneys general in
investigating LIBOR manipulation); Darrell Preston, Rigged Libor Hits States-Localities With $6 Billion:
Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-09/rigged-libor-hitsstates-localities-with-6-billion-muni-credit.html.
110
In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 1 (June
27, 2012); 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13(a)(2), 13b (2012).
111
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984).
112
In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC & Barclays Capital Inc., CFTC Docket 12-25, 26 (June
108
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The creation of the CFTC was a Congressional response to increased
participation in the futures market as “the shift to a market-oriented
economy . . . caused merchandisers and processors to make greater use of
the futures markets to hedge their risks against substantial price rises.”113
The CFTC is responsible for “assur[ing] the economic utility of the futures
markets by encouraging their competitiveness and efficiency, protecting
market participants against fraud, manipulation, and abusive trading
practices, and by ensuring the financial integrity of the clearing process.”114
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Bill and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank) greatly expanded the historically meager enforcement
powers of the CFTC.115 They now rival the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s enforcement powers.116
This increased enforcement
authority has led to an increase in enforcement actions: from 2010 to 2011,
CFTC enforcement actions increased 74% and included seventy criminal
convictions and indictments.117 The scope of these actions range from fines
levied against international banks like Barclays, UBS, and RBS for
millions of dollars to fines against individuals for several hundreds of
thousands of dollars.118 This sort of prosecutorial activity is in stark
contrast to conditions described above in the United Kingdom, where
regulators are only now getting the power to criminally prosecute
manipulators.
As a matter of policy, the CFTC’s mission of public protection drives
the agency.119 The Chairman of the CFTC, Gary Gensler, has articulated
27, 2012).
113
Graham Purcell & Abelardo Lopez Valdez, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974: Regulatory Legislation for Commodity Futures Trading in a Market-Oriented Economy, 21 S.D.
L. REV. 555, 555–56 (1976).
114
Mission & Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/
About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
115
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (relevant portions codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)).
116
See Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/
LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/index.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2012); Tyler Layne, The New CFTC
Enforcement Rules: A Step in the Right Direction?, Comment to C.F.T.C. Is Set to Get Tougher on
Fraud, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/Drupal/blogs/blogentry/new-cftc-enforcement-rules-step-right-direction-01-05-2011.
117
Joshua Horn, Expect More Investigations and Enforcement Actions from CFTC, WESTLAW NEWS
& INSIGHT BLOG (Oct. 25, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/Insight/2011/10__October/Expect_more_investigations_and_enforcement_ actions_from_CFTC/.
118
See Enforcement Press Releases, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/EnforcementPressReleases/index.htm (last accessed
Feb. 16, 2003).
119
Gary Gensler, Chairman of Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote Address before the
George Washington University Center for Law, Economics, and Finance Conference: The New Era of
Swaps Market Reform (Oct. 10, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-124).
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priorities of transparency, separation of consumer investment funds from
operational funds, and a preference for benchmark interest rates like
LIBOR to be tied to real-world transactions.120 However, despite its
mission and policy preferences, the CFTC’s jurisdiction is limited to the
futures market. Given this limited jurisdiction, it makes sense to turn to the
DOJ, a government agency with broader enforcement powers that has also
been involved in the LIBOR scandal.
B. The Department of Justice
In June 2012, the Fraud Section of the DOJ announced a settlement
agreement with Barclays where the Fraud Section agreed to forgo further
prosecution in exchange for a significant fine and Barclays’s cooperation
with the Fraud Section’s investigations.121 As this section explains, the
presence of the Fraud Section and its powers of criminal enforcement
suggest that the “people problem” discussed in Part III may not be as
prevalent in the United States, at least insofar as the “people problem” is
associated with a lack of criminal enforcement.122
The Fraud Section is the DOJ’s “front-line litigating unit that acts as a
rapid response team, investigating and prosecuting complex white collar
crime cases throughout the country.”123 The Fraud Section is a sub-agency
of the DOJ, and is guided by its mission to enforce the law and control
crime.124
As it applies to corporate crimes, principles promulgated by the
Attorney General, the federal government’s chief law-enforcement official,
guide the Fraud Section.125 These general principles provide guidance for

120
Id. (expressing support for the “clearinghouse” protections stemming from Dodd-Frank whereby
firms are prevented from “using the collateral attributable to cleared swaps customers who haven’t
defaulted to cover losses of defaulting customers”).
121
Letter from Denis McInerney, Chief, Criminal Div., Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Steven R. Peiken, David H. Braff, Jeffrey T. Scott & Matthew S. Fitzwater, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP,
Re: Barclay’s Bank PLC (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/33720
1271017335469822.pdf.
122
In cases analogous to the LIBOR scandal where the parties involved are international entities
subject to both U.K. and U.S. regulation, the distinction between the two systems should not be of much
practical difference because they overlap. Of course, it is not clear that the threat of criminal sanctions
would be an effective deterrent to some individuals. See, e.g., David Enrich, Rate-Rig Spotlight Falls
on ‘Rain Man,’ WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2013, 9:29 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887
324445904578285810706107442.html?KEYWORDS=Department+of+Justice+Libor.
123
Fraud Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ (last visited Nov.
20, 2012).
124
About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html (last updated Mar.
2012).
125
Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen. on Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Corporations to Heads of Dep’ts Components, U.S. Att’ys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at
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both federal prosecutors and corporate leaders, with the goal of better
securing “public confidence in business entities.”126 The principles also
provide a list of factors to consider in determining whether to prosecute a
crime.127
These general principles give federal prosecutors room to settle with
corporations as the Fraud Division did with Barclays. But, the DOJ also
touts the success of federal prosecutors in “root[ing] out corruption in
financial markets and corporate board rooms across the country.”128
However, rather than boasting a conviction rate or incarceration rate of
criminals, the DOJ suggests that “[t]he most significant result of this
enforcement initiative is that corporations increasingly recognize the need
for self-policing, self-reporting, and cooperation with law enforcement.”129
The fact that the DOJ chooses to emphasize the need for self-policing in the
business community along with the success of federal prosecutors
demonstrates a balance within the DOJ of aggressively pursuing criminal
conduct and encouraging firms to self-police.
There are limits to the DOJ’s talk of “principles.” It might be
tempting to see the DOJ’s use of “principles” terminology as an analog to
the light-touch approach to regulation in the United Kingdom. However,
even though this approach has led to more self-policing by firms, that
change must be viewed in light of the DOJ’s aggressive efforts to root out
corruption.
Coupled with the CFTC’s recent prosecutorial efforts
discussed above, financial regulation in the United States clearly has
greater sanctions for individuals than in the United Kingdom.
In the face of the United States’ complex financial regulatory scheme,
it is difficult to synthesize conclusions or policies guiding regulation.
However, three points are clear. First, in the United States there is, as the
proliferation of agencies demonstrates, an underlying tendency towards
intensive regulation. The broadening of CFTC enforcement powers under
Dodd-Frank in response to the recent financial crisis also affirms this
tendency.
Second, in the federal system, there is a robust role for criminal
prosecutions. Not only did Barclays pay steep fines to the CFTC, it also
paid a fine to the DOJ. There is also reason to think that there may be
criminal charges levied against other banks as a result of ongoing
investigation into the LIBOR scandal.130 Additionally, the DOJ has
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
126
Id. at 1.
127
These factors include the seriousness of the crime, the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the
corporation, the adequacy of prosecution of individual wrongdoers within the corporation, and the
adequacy of civil or regulatory remedies. Id. at 4.
128
Id. at 1.
129
Id.
130
See Letter from Denis McInerney, supra note 121. For further suggestion that the DOJ will
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recently taken steps to bolster the Fraud Section, which will increase its
ability to prosecute fraud.131
Finally, the proliferation of agencies and the varied enforcement
messages each agency might send toward affected firms suggests that
compliance with the regulatory scheme is more difficult than it needs to be.
While any individual agency might adopt a more lenient approach, banks
still face a maze of administrative and criminal regulations.
VI. COMPARING THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM IN LIGHT OF THE LIBOR SCANDAL
Parts IV and V briefly explained the structure and philosophy of bank
regulators in the United Kingdom and United States. Part VI compares the
regulatory structures of the United States and United Kingdom. Part VI
also uses the three LIBOR-scandal problems (people, reality, and publicity)
identified above to examine the regulatory structure of both the United
Kingdom and the United States. Additionally, Part VI examines the
question of which model ought to be favored more fully.
A. Towards a Hybrid Approach
In the United Kingdom, the Review marks the end of the light-touch
era of financial regulation. The government’s adoption of the Review’s
recommendations appears to have significantly increased the agency-based
oversight as well as the criminal sanctions involved in setting future
LIBOR. In other words, it represents a move towards the U.S. model
characterized by more invasive regulation and sanctions. However, in
comparison to the plethora of state and federal agencies and government
entities regulating a financial firm in the United States,132 the Review
seems to be only a small step toward the U.S. model.
It might seem as though the United States has an advantage in solving
the people problem when it comes to criminal sanctions, at least if the
prosecution of offenders is taken as a measure of success. This conclusion
must be tempered by the fact that, thus far, Barclays received essentially
the same kind of penalty in the United States and the United Kingdom. As
of this writing, only a single individual has been targeted for criminal
continue pursuing criminal sanctions, see David Henrich, Evan Perez, & Dana Cimilluca, U.S. Wants
Criminal Charges for RBS, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2013, 7:39 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000
1424127887323644904578270070760266356.html?mod=WSJ_qtoverview_wsjlatest.
131
Joe Palazzolo, DOJ Strengthening Its Fraud Section, Wiretap Unit, Corruption Currents, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2010, 12:53 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/11/04/doj-strengthening
-its-fraud-section-wiretap-unit/.
132
Which, as discussed supra in Part V, the CFTC and DOJ are only a small sample.
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sanctions in the United States in connection with the LIBOR scandal.133
Regardless of this fact, it remains true, as discussion of the DOJ and CFTC
above shows, that the financial regulatory apparatus in the United States
offers a greater threat of criminal sanctions.
Overall, determining which model works better is a matter of priorities
and values. If the light-touch approach was in fact a “regulatory
dividend”134 for banks that drove them to do business in London, then the
economic impact of increased regulation might encourage banks to move
their business elsewhere.
Yet, this reasoning also suggests that the United Kingdom retains the
upper hand in direct comparison to the United States. Even after
implementing the Review’s recommendations, the United Kingdom
remains less regulated than the United States. As confirmation, one
financial commentator has suggested that Dodd-Frank’s tougher rules are
leading some international banks to reconsider their contracts with banks in
the United States.135 If so, then it stands to reason that when a bank has a
choice between the United Kingdom and the United States, it will prefer
the milder regulatory structure of the United Kingdom, even after the
Review’s recommendations have been enacted.
On the other hand, it may have been the permissive stance toward
regulation in the light-touch era that gave rise to the LIBOR manipulations
in the first place. If the goal of financial regulation is to avoid this sort of
manipulation, then one might reasonably favor the more rigorous
regulatory scheme of the United States over the United Kingdom. After
all, the LIBOR scandal is not the only scandal currently facing the United
Kingdom’s banks.136 For instance, the light-touch approach has also been
linked to recent allegations against U.K. banks of illicitly processing
Iranian financial transactions and accepting deposits from money
launderers.137 A more robust regulatory scheme might have prevented
133
See Enrich, supra note 122. Only three individuals have currently been charged in the U.K. See
Kristin Ridley & Tommy Wilkes, Judge Sets October As Showtime in UK Libor Hearings, REUTERS
(July 30, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/30/us-britain-libor-idUSBRE96T0Z
A20130730.
134
Cole, supra note 47.
135
Luke Jeffs & Nia Williams, Dodd-Frank forces European Banks to Review U.S. Deals,
REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/26/us-europe-derivatives-doddfrankidUSBRE89P0UZ20121026. For example, the CFTC identified 38 areas in the swaps market that it
would write rules on in light of Dodd-Frank. See Rulemaking Areas, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2013).
136
London-based bank HSBC was recently charged with being a “conduit” for illicit money
laundering by a number of nefarious groups including terrorist organizations, Mexican drug cartels, and
the Iranian government. See HSBC Money Laundering Report: Key Findings, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11,
2012, 5:31 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18880269.
137
Deborah Hargreaves, Why UK Banks Deserve to Sweat Under the Scrutiny of US Regulators,
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some of this malfeasance.
A better path lies somewhere in the middle of the two positions
occupied by the United States and the United Kingdom. It seems clear that
the era of light-touch regulation gave rise to conditions that allowed
fraudulent manipulation of LIBOR to flourish. Without fear of regulators
or criminal sanctions, bankers in London were able to act in less than
ethical ways without fear of reprisal. However, it is difficult to defend the
regulatory excesses of the U.S. system. Such invasive oversight, after all,
failed to prevent the sub-prime mortgage crisis or the wave of high profile
“Ponzi schemes” in recent years.138
An ideal solution would meet in the middle by strengthening the
regulatory structure in the United Kingdom while simplifying the
regulatory scheme in the United States. The recommendations of the
Review can be viewed as embodying this kind of hybrid approach since
they strengthen the regulatory powers of the government without losing
sight of the important role that financial firms can play. By adequately
striking this balance, future manipulation may be prevented without risking
the alienation of firms.
B. Some Objections Considered
One practical objection to this compromise solution is that it is too
difficult to accomplish in reality. In response to crises like the LIBOR
scandal, one tactic for regulators or lawmakers is to simply insist on
passing new laws or enacting new regulation without critically evaluating
their impact. Luca Enriques, former Commissioner of the Italian
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB),139 captures
the rationale behind this “knee-jerk” reaction well:
[A]s conventional wisdom has it, if there is a crisis, then
regulators must have previously failed to do their job by omitting
to take action, whether regulatory or supervisory, that could have
GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2012, 12:51 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/10/uk-bankssweating-under-scrutiny-us-regulators.
138
Unfortunately, examples of recent Ponzi schemes are easy to come by. For a timeline of Bernard
Madoff’s scheme, see Bernard L. Madoff, Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/people/m/bernard_l_madoff/index.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2013). For a
description of a particularly modern Ponzi scheme involving the electronic currency bitcoin, see Kevin
Roose, Shockingly Something Called The ‘Bitcoin Savings And Trust’ Was A Ponzi Scheme, The Daily
Intelligencer, N.Y. MAG. (Jul. 23, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/07/wasa-ponzi-scheme.html.
139
The CONSOB is the chief Italian securities regulator. See Consob: What It Is and What It Does,
CONSOB, http://www.consob.it/mainen/consob/what/what.html?symblink=/mainen/consob/what/index.html
(last visited Sept. 11, 2013).
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prevented it. Thus, further inaction, however justified in theory,
is intolerable . . . a diffused sense of urgency implies that
everyone is expected to do his or her part to avert the meltdown,
and it would be embarrassing for any institution to confess that
there is nothing it can do to help . . . .140
According to Enriques, political realties force regulators and
lawmakers to act in the face of a crisis, even if they were not to blame for
the underlying crisis.141 This is true, he argues, even if empirical data
suggests a change in laws or regulation will not solve the underlying
problems that precipitated the crisis in question.142 His somewhat cynical
conclusion is that the best approach for regulators in the wake of crises is
“maintaining pretense of doing something while actually innovating very
little . . . .”143 Essentially, Enriques argues that the kinds of regulations and
laws that crises generate are not very effective, so those lawmakers and
regulators who earnestly desire well-functioning markets should leave the
markets alone during times of crisis, even if they need to put on a political
show to satisfy the public.
Author David John of the Heritage Foundation makes a similar
argument. He argues that in response to the LIBOR crisis, no new laws are
necessary, but financial regulators should simply enforce already existing
laws and regulations.144 In explaining the LIBOR scandal, John blames
delay on the part of some regulators to act when they first learned of the
potential LIBOR manipulation.145 John points to the fact that Barclays and
other banks that manipulated LIBOR will pay large fines as proof that
existing laws are adequate.146 Implicit in John’s argument is the idea that
regulatory reform either cannot or should not attempt to prevent
manipulation if post-hoc remedies are capable of punishing those
responsible. In short, John argues that current laws, if adequately enforced,
are sufficient.147

140
Luca Enriques, Regulators’ Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation of
Financial Markets: One Reluctant Regulator’s View, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1148 (2009).
Although Enriques is responding to the sub-prime credit crisis at the end of the last decade, his
reasoning can easily extend to the sort of crisis of confidence that the LIBOR scandal represents.
141
Id. at 1148–49.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 1147.
144
David C. John, LIBOR Rigging Scandal: No New Laws Necessary, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/libor-rigging-scandal-no-new-lawsnecessary.
145
Id. In particular, John points to the failure of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner to act when
he learned of the potential manipulation by Barclays as early as April 2008.
146
Id.
147
Id.
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C. Does Financial Regulation Really Stifle Growth or Prevent
Crises?
Enriques and John are both suspicious of the idea of passing new laws
in response to a financial scandal. Although the hybrid approach advocated
for above would not always call for passing new laws, the objection is
worth considering. In evaluating the objection, it would be helpful to
examine empirical evidence. However, there is a lack of decisive empirical
evidence that would indicate when regulation prevents a crisis or when too
much regulation stifles economic growth.148 According to one group of
scholars from the Central Bank of Chile: “[T]here appears to be a universal
belief among those who have studied these issues that inappropriate
regulations and supervisory standards in a country not only retard its longrun economic growth but also increase the likelihood of financial crisis that
could spread beyond the country’s own borders.”149
Yet, despite this widespread belief that over-regulation can stifle
growth and hasten crises, it is not clear that empirical data supports it. In
their study, the Central Bank of Chile scholars gathered information from
45 countries and came to several conclusions.150 First, weaker central
governments tend to impose harsher restrictions on banking activities.151
Second, countries with more restrictive systems of regulation do not
necessarily have poorer functioning banking systems.152 Finally, countries
with more restrictive regulatory systems have a greater probability of
suffering a banking crisis.153
The second and third conclusions of their study are striking, especially
in the context of proposing a direction for financial regulatory reform. The
empirical evidence seems to contradict the notion that a stricter regulatory
system, by itself, hurts economic development. At the same time, the
evidence shows that a stricter regulatory regime actually correlates with a
greater likelihood of suffering a banking crisis. Focusing on the kinds of
regulations a country puts in place can resolve this discrepancy: “Our
findings indicate that countries with weak governments—that is,
148
The argument that too much regulation stifles growth is clearly implied in the “regulatory
dividend” said to result from Britain’s light-touch approach. See supra Part IV.A.
149
James Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, Financial Regulation and Performance: CrossCountry Evidence 118 (Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 118, 2001), available at
http://www.bcentral.cl/estudios/documentos-trabajo/pdf/dtbc118.pdf.
150
Id. at 33–34 (noting that “a country is considered to have experienced a crisis only when the
estimated losses [to the government due to banking sector problems] were greater than 5 percent of
GDP”).
151
Id. at 4.
152
Id.
153
Id.
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governments that are less likely to (a) supervise banks approximately or (b)
create proper incentives for private sector participants to supervise banks—
also on average impose harsher restrictions on the activities of banks.”154
In other words, weaker governments that do not appropriately
supervise banks or incentivize private sector supervision of banks appear to
overcompensate for this weakness by imposing harsher restrictions on
banks.
These harsher restrictions were not merely harsher than
alternatives. They were the kind of restrictions that tended to lower the
value of banks by hampering their ability to diversify assets and
investments, thereby making them more susceptible to crisis.155
The Central Bank of Chile study suggests two points relevant to the
discussion of financial reform. First, financial regulation, by itself, is not
likely to be a barrier to economic growth. Second, the evidence suggests
that laws or regulations that tend to lower the value of a bank make
countries imposing those restrictions more likely to suffer economic crisis.
Although the Central Bank of Chile study found that regulations did
not necessarily hamper growth, it did find a correlation between harsh
restrictions and banking crises. The study suggests that one need not
follow the cynical or skeptical path of Enriques or John in assessing
financial reform because the right kinds of regulations do not hamper
economic growth. The Review’s recommendations that LIBOR be tied to
actual market data and that the FSA have broader criminal enforcement
powers do not appear to limit the kind of activities that add value to banks,
since they do not preclude banks from diversifying their activities.
Although nothing in the plethora of regulations faced by banks in the
United States requires harsher restrictions, the risk of harsher laws or
regulations seems greater where there are more parties involved, each with
the potential to impose regulations or sanctions. Even though the United
Kingdom has moved on from the light-touch era of regulation, its banks do
not face anything like the legal and regulatory apparatus in the United
States. Ideally, the United States could simplify its regulatory structure to
more closely resemble that of the United Kingdom. While the practical and
political steps needed for the United States to accomplish this
simplification are outside the bounds of this Note, the empirical evidence in
the Central Bank of Chile study suggests that reducing the risk of financial
regulations that are so harsh as to threaten diversification may well be
worth the practical or political costs.

154

Id. at 18.
In general, restrictions that keep banks from diversifying their activities made those countries
more susceptible to crises. See id. at 5.
155
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VII. CONCLUSION
The LIBOR scandal illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of
approaches to banking regulation in both the United States and the United
Kingdom. The light-touch era of financial regulation in the United
Kingdom was, perhaps, a blessing and a curse: while it may have attracted
banks to do business in the United Kingdom, it may have also facilitated
the LIBOR scandal. Despite the fact that regulators in the United States
have greater power to pursue criminal sanctions against individual
manipulators, it remains too difficult to justify the overwhelming
complication of the U.S. regulatory structure.
Although neither the United States nor the United Kingdom can stake
a claim to perfection, the recently adopted recommendations of the
Wheatley Review in the United Kingdom offer a promising compromise.
The Review’s recommendations offer solutions to the people, reality, and
publicity problems presented by the LIBOR scandal without being so harsh
as to threaten economic growth. Despite its departure from the light-touch
approach to financial regulation, the Review’s approach is likely to
minimize the risk of future manipulation, while not imposing too great a
cost on financial firms. The United Kingdom has the better model of
financial regulation, especially once it enacts the recommendations of the
Review. In the future, the United Kingdom will likely continue to enjoy
the benefits of its simpler regulatory structure, while preventing the
problems that the LIBOR scandal exposed.
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